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INTRODUCTION
In their recent article, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial
Boilerplate,1 Professors Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Robert E.
Scott identify a phenomenon found in standardized contracts they
describe as “contractual black holes.”2 The concept of black holes
comes from theoretical physics. Under the original hypothesis, the
gravitational pull of a black hole is so strong that once light or
information is pulled past an event horizon into a black hole, it
cannot escape.3 In recent years, the thesis has been reformulated
such that the current thesis is that some information can escape, but
it is so degraded that it is virtually useless.4 In their article, Choi,
Gulati, and Scott apply the black hole concept to certain
standardized contractual boilerplate provisions.
A contractual black hole is “a boilerplate term that is reused for
decades and without reflection merely because it is part of a
standard form package of terms, [and is thereby] emptied of any
recoverable meaning.”5 Closely related to contractual black holes
are “contractual grey holes.”6 A contractual grey hole is a
meaningless variation of a boilerplate term that has been repeatedly
reused over a long period of time such that it “has lost much (but not
necessarily all) meaning.”7 In short, contractual black holes lack any
meaning, while contractual grey holes may still contain some

Copyright © 2017 Christopher C. French.
† Christopher C. French is a Professor of Practice at Penn State Law School; J.D.,
Harvard Law School; B.A., Columbia University.
1. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in
Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1 (2017).
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 3 n.2.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id.
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meaning, but there is no basis for making a legal distinction between
the variations in the language that have appeared over time.8
Although their article focuses on pari passu clauses in
sovereign debt contracts, Choi, Gulati, and Scott note that
“[i]nsurance contracts appear to be another area with the potential
for such terms.”9 They are correct.
Insurance policies are the grandparents of contractual black
holes. Insurance traces its origins to 2250 B.C. when Babylonian
maritime traders entered “bottomry” contracts, in which a party
loaned money to a shipper with the understanding that the money
would not be repaid if the ship sank or was pirated.10 Bottomry
contracts eventually evolved into modern insurance and Lloyd’s of
London issued the first maritime insurance policies in the 1600s.11
Almost 100 years ago, insurance policies were the first type of
standardized agreement to be called “contracts of adhesion.”12
Through rote re-usage, many of the terms and conditions contained
in insurance policies sold today have been in use for decades.13 The

8. Id. at 4 n.3. This Essay refers to both contractual black and grey holes as contractual
black holes despite the minor difference between the two.
9. Id. at 7 n.16 (citing Christopher C. French, Understanding Insurance Policies as
Noncontracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing These Unique Financial
Instruments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 547–48 (2017)).
10. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW 16 (5th ed. 2012) (noting the earliest traces of risk transference resembling insurance can
be found within ancient Babylonian society).
11. Id. at 16–17.
12. See Cheryl B. Preston & Eli McCann, Llewellyn Slept Here: A Short History of Sticky
Contracts and Feudalism, 91 OR. L. REV. 129, 131 (2012) (citing Edwin W. Patterson, The
Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919) (describing standardized
life insurance policies as contracts of adhesion)).
13. See, e.g., JOHN F. DOBBYN & CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL
64 (5th ed. 2015) (“[M]any of the terms and conditions contained in standard form policies
were drafted many years ago and are reused each time a new version of the policy form is
issued.”); DONALD S. MALECKI & DAVID D. THAMANN, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY
COVERAGE GUIDE 363-662 (11th ed. 2015) (reproducing the various iterations of the Insurance
Services Office, Inc.’s standard Commercial General Liability policy form that have been used
for the past 40 years, which reveals the various iterations of the policies contain many
provisions that are identical or substantially similar); Michelle E. Boardman, Contra
Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1113 (2006)
(arguing that the predictability in the interpretation of policy language by courts incentivizes not
changing policy language); see also Christopher C. French, The “Non-Cumulation Clause”: An
“Other Insurance” Clause by Another Name, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 375, 388 (2011) [hereinafter
French, “Non-Cumulation Clause”] (discussing the transfer of the language contained in the
non-cumulation clause drafted in 1960 to the 1971 version of the policy that is still found in
some policies today).
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continual reuse of antiquated policy language is, in part, due to the
frequent application of a strict liability version of contra proferentem
to the interpretation of insurance policies.14 Thus, because changing
the policy language could be viewed as an admission that the prior
language was ambiguous or because the existing language already
has been held to be unambiguous, insurers are naturally reluctant to
change policy language that has already been interpreted by courts.
Consequently, insurance policies are particularly susceptible to
the formation of contractual black holes. Indeed, some courts view
insurance policies as massive contractual black holes from which
only a few flashes of light (i.e., meaning) escape.15 To test the
hypothesis that insurance policies contain, or even embody,
contractual black holes, this Essay considers four provisions found
in commercial insurance policies: 1) “Sue and Labor” Clauses, 2)
“Ensuing Loss” Clauses, 3) “Non-Cumulation” Clauses, and 4) the
“Sudden and Accidental” Pollution Exclusion. These four policy
provisions are suitable subjects because they either have generated
significant amounts of litigation with inconsistent court rulings or they
are facially complex or confusing. An examination of these
provisions demonstrates that the hypothesis that insurance policies
house many contractual black holes is both confirmed and refuted.
Some policy provisions have become contractual black holes, some

14. See Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 531, 538 (1996) (“The strict liability approach to ambiguity is the principal feature of the
hornbook statement of contra proferentem . . . . If a policy provision is ‘ambiguous’—
reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation by the ordinary reader of the policy—
then the . . . interpretation more favorable to the insured governs . . . .”); Boardman, supra
note 13, at 1113; French, supra note 9, at 557–58 (“Unlike in typical contract disputes where
contra proferentem [is] a tiebreaker when ambiguous policy language cannot be conclusively
clarified by extrinsic evidence, most courts simply construe any ambiguities in the policy
language against the insurer and in favor of coverage. [Thus,] contra proferentem . . . in
insurance cases has been described as strict liability for the insurer.” (footnotes omitted)).
15. Although they do not use the term “contractual black hole,” some courts have
described insurance policies as “incomprehensible” and “a mere flood of darkness and
confusion.” See, e.g., Storms v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 388 A.2d 578, 580 (N.H. 1978)
(“[I]nsurance policies [contain such] complex verbiage that ‘they would not be understood by
men in general, even if [the policies were] subjected to a careful and laborious study. . . . [The
policy] would, unless he were an extraordinary man, be an inexplicable riddle, a mere flood of
darkness and confusion.’” (second alteration in original) (third DeLancy v. Rockingham
Farmers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 52 N.H. 581, 587–88 (N.H. 1873))); S.C. Ins. Co. v. Fid. & Guar.
Ins. Underwriters, 489 S.E.2d 200, 206 (S.C. 1997) (“Ambiguity and incomprehensibility seem
to be the favorite tools of the insurance trade in drafting policies. Most are a virtually
impenetrable thicket of incomprehensible verbosity.” (quoting Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 451 S.W.2d 616, 622 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970))).
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provisions are only apparent contractual black holes,16 and some
provisions, while on their way to becoming contractual black holes,
were saved before their original meaning crossed the event horizon.
To understand this conclusion, this Essay proceeds in two parts.
Part I explores how the insurance policy drafting process results in
the rote reuse of policy language. Part II considers the origins and
purposes of the four provisions at issue, and then analyzes whether
each provision has become a black hole.
I. THE DRAFTING AND ROTE REUSE OF INSURANCE POLICY LANGUAGE
Insurance policies are complex financial instruments drafted by
insurers and then sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.17 An insurance
organization called the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) drafts
many of the commonly used policy forms and then seeks to have
the forms approved by state insurance commissioners.18 Insurers
pay fees for ISO membership, which allows them to use the policy
forms drafted by ISO.19
Much of the policy language used in ISO’s standard forms was
written decades ago, but ISO continues to recycle the same

16. “Apparent contractual black holes,” as the phrase is used in this Essay, are provisions
that do not appear to have meaning, but a consensus regarding their meaning can be found in
case law.
17. See, e.g., 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERICK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL AND KNUTSEN ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE § 4.06[b], at 4–65 (Wolters Kluwer 4th ed. Supp. 2017) (“In a sense,
the typical insurance contract is one of ‘super-adhesion’ in that the contract is completely
standardized and not even reviewed prior to contract formation.”); Michelle Boardman,
Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2010)
[hereinafter Boardman, Insuring Understanding] (describing the “hyperstandardization” of
insurance policies); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107,
125 (2007) (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance companies provide identical coverage
on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle, 76 VA. L. REV.
1113, 1153 (1990) (“[P]roperty owner’s liability insurance contracts are standardized across
insurers in a form few insureds have the power or experience to bargain around.”).
18. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993) (“[A]n
association of approximately 1,400 domestic property and casualty insurers[, ISO] is the
almost exclusive source of support services in this country for CGL insurance. ISO develops
standard policy forms . . . ; most CGL insurance written in the United States is written on these
forms.” (citation omitted)); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 879 n.6 (Fla.
2007) (“The Insurance Services Office, Inc., also known as ISO, is an industry organization
that promulgates various standard insurance policies that are utilized by insurers throughout
the country . . . .”).
19. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND
REGULATION 36–37 (6th ed. 2015).
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language in subsequent versions of its policies.20 For example,
ISO’s 1973 Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy form
defines “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured.”21 Forty years later, ISO’s 2013 CGL policy form still
defines “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions.”22 Despite being issued 40 years apart, both versions
use the phrase “an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure.” The minor variation in the wording of the phrases is an
example of what Choi, Gulati, and Scott describe as “encrustation,”
where minor changes in language do not really affect its legal
meaning.23 Notably, even though the meaning of the term “accident”
has been litigated over and over again for decades, which has
produced an array of different court interpretations of the term, ISO
has never bothered to define the term in CGL policies.24
When it comes to seeking guidance regarding the intent of the
drafters, the original drafters typically cannot be called upon to shed
light on the meaning of antiquated policy language.25 They are often

20. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
21. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form, Definitions (1973), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 363.
22. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 04 13, Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form, Definition No. 13 (2013), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at
617. The “expected or intended” language contained in the definition of “occurrence” in the
1973 policy was moved to the exclusions section of the policy form in 2013: “This insurance
does not apply to . . . ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured.” Id. at 604 (Exclusion 2.a).
23. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 5.
24. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., 720 So. 2d 1072, 1075
(Fla. 1998) (“The difficulty in precisely defining the scope of coverage in liability policies
providing coverage for ‘accidents’ is not a problem of recent vintage. As Judge Van Nortwick
observed . . . few insurance policy terms have ‘provoked more controversy in litigation than
the word “accident.”’” (quoting CTC Dev. Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 704 So. 2d 579,
581 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997) (Van Nortwick, J., concurring))).
25. See e.g., DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 13, at 64; see also French, “Non-Cumulation
Clause,” supra note 13, at 386–89. In an attempt to understand the original drafter’s intent, the
author relied upon the deposition testimony of an insurance policy drafter, who incorporated
earlier policy language into a new policy form, regarding the original drafter’s intent because
the original drafter was dead. See French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 386–
89.
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unidentifiable or have died during the many years that have elapsed
since they drafted the policy language.26
Documentation regarding the drafters’ intent is also often
unavailable.27 The lack of documentation may be intentional by
insurers because, as a result of the use of a strict liability version of
contra proferetem with respect to ambiguities in insurance policies,
insurers always take the position that the policy language is
unambiguous.28 If the language is unambiguous, then no extrinsic
evidence is needed or used to interpret it. Consequently, ISO and
insurers have a good reason not to preserve documentation of
intent.
Insurance law essentially dictates this result. Unlike typical
contract disputes in which extrinsic evidence regarding the parties’
mutual intent is admissible to resolve disputes regarding ambiguous
contract language, there is no mutual intent to discern with respect
to insurance policies. Policyholders play no role in the drafting of
insurance policies and they do not even get a copy of the policies
until after purchasing them.29 Even the insurers selling the policies
typically do not know the intent of policy language because they did
not draft it.30 Thus, because any finding of ambiguity in the policy
language almost automatically means the insurer loses, policy
language can never be ambiguous from the insurer’s perspective
once a coverage dispute arises.
Another disincentive to redrafting and modernizing policy
language is that doing so could be viewed as an admission that the
older policy language is either unclear or actually covers the types of

26. See id.
27. See, e.g., DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 13, at 64 (“Documentation regarding the
intent of the drafters also rarely exists. Consequently, it often is impossible to discern the
original intent of the drafters of standard form policy language.”); French, “Non-Cumulation
Clause,” supra note 13, at 386–89 (relying upon secondhand deposition testimony to
understand the drafter’s intent regarding the non-cumulation clause because of a lack of
documentary evidence).
28. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
29. See Boardman, supra note 13, at 1120; French, supra note 9, at 537, 548 (citing
Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policyholders’
Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 363
(1998)).
30. See supra notes 18–20, 25–26 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Employees regularly using a
form often have only a limited understanding of its terms and limited authority to vary them.”);
Anderson & Fournier, supra note 29, at 364.
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losses the insurer has been contending it does not.31 Thus,
redrafting and modernizing the language could lead to insurers
losing future cases decided under the older policy language. This
leads to the rote reuse of the same policy language decade after
decade.
Some scholars also have theorized that insurers are reluctant to
redraft old policy language because their actuarial data, and thus
premiums, are based upon the language already in use.32 This
argument has intuitive appeal, but it may not be empirically correct.
Premiums generally are based upon broad factors, such as the
nature of the policyholder’s business, the size of the policyholder’s
operations, the policyholder’s number of employees, the
policyholder’s gross revenues or sales, and the policyholder’s loss
history, rather than the granular language of specific policy
provisions.33 With that said, however, insurers routinely add
exclusions for certain types of losses they do not want to cover if
courts begin to interpret their policies to provide such coverage.34
31. See, e.g., Michelle Boardman, Blank, Black, and Grey Holes in Insurance Contracts
17 (Mar. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Boardman
%20Black%20Holes%20in%20Insurance%20Contracts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2N9Z-8CEN]
(“[I]nsurers are generally unwilling to add specific exclusions in future policies if their position
is that the previous policies did not cover the loss either.”).
32. See, e.g., id. at 16 (“Changing contract language may require letting go of, or
weakening the predictive power of, valuable actuarial data.”); see also Boardman, supra note
13, at 1116 (“[T]he cost of each clause becomes increasingly clear as actuarial data is
collected and pooled.”).
33. See, e.g., What Goes into the Price of a General Liability Insurance Policy for Small
Businesses?, INSUREON BLOG (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.insureon.com/blog/post/2014/03/12/
general-liability-price-factors.aspx [https://perma.cc/9LH9-UJWK] (listing the 8 factors that
determine premium rates as: 1) “Size and Condition of Your Business Premises, 2) “Type of
Business Operations/Industry,” 3) “Experience in Your Profession, Field, or Business,” 4)
Number of Employees,” 5) “Location of Your Business,” 6) “Limits and Deductibles,” 7) “Policy
Features,” and 8) “Claims History”); see also Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 226 F.
Supp. 3d 537, 542 (W.D.N.C. 2017) (“[The insurer] calculated the final premium (i.e. price)
charged to [the policyholder] for CGL insurance provided under the [insurer’s] policies based
on [the policyholder’s] payroll on all of [the policyholder’s] operations. . . .”); Monkey Ridge,
LLC v. Unigard Ins. Co., No. 2:16-CV-0213, 2016 WL 5864428, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 6,
2016) (“[The insurer] calculated the premiums due on the CGL Policy part of the Primary
Policy and the Umbrella Policy based on the number of properties identified and the acreage
of those properties.”); Essex Ins. Co. v. Ragland Mills, Inc., No. 06-0737-CV-W, 2008 WL
351014, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 6, 2008) (“This premium was calculated based upon the
hazards and gross receipts of elevator inspection.”).
34. See, e.g., Christopher C. French, The Role of the Profit Imperative in Risk
Management, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1096–1114 (2015) (discussing insurers’ additions of
exclusions for pollution claims, asbestos claims, terrorism claims, Y2K claims, and mold
claims after losses associated with such claims began to materialize).
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So, the idea that insurers have an incentive not to make dramatic
changes to policy language may have some merit even if the
specific wording of individual policy provisions is not part of the
premium calculation.
Finally, the meaning of certain provisions in policies also has
been obfuscated by the incredibly complex structure of policies that
has developed over time. Consider, for example, ISO’s 2013 CGL
policy form. When originally conceived and created, the CGL policy
form was the broadest form of liability coverage available under
which the insurer agreed to pay “all sums” for which the policyholder
became liable for “bodily injuries” or “property damage” caused by
an accident.35 One might expect a policy providing such broad
coverage to be a simple, short document. That would be a mistake.
The 2013 CGL policy form contains: three sections setting forth the
different types of coverage provided, thirty-eight exclusions, nine
conditions, and twenty-two definitions (not including the two pages it
takes to explain who is an “insured” under the policy).36
In sum, the antiquated insurance policy language reused
decade after decade, combined with the increasing length and
complex organization of the numerous terms, conditions, and
exclusions that are cross-referenced throughout, is a recipe for the
development of contractual black holes.37 The next Part tests this
hypothesis by considering four policy provisions found in commercial
insurance policies.

35. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability
and Insurance After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 358 (2006). Notably,
when the CGL policy form was first introduced in the 1940s it was called “Comprehensive
General Liability” insurance. ISO reduced the coverage provided under CGL policies by
adding more and more exclusions to the policy form over the decades and renamed the policy
“Commercial General Liability” insurance in 1986, but retained the CGL acronym. Id. at 355.
36. See MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 603–18.
37. See Boardman, supra note 17, at 1119 (“It is not just the language of insurance
policies that makes for difficult reading. The order of the language, the parachronistic structure
of the policy, and the intimate connection between clauses found in separate ‘sections’ pages
apart, [make the policy difficult to understand. Thus,] consumer[s] . . . often miss . . .
controlling clauses.”).
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II. EXAMPLES OF POTENTIAL CONTRACTUAL BLACK HOLES IN
INSURANCE POLICIES
A. Non-Cumulation Clauses
The first candidate for contractual black hole status is the NonCumulation Clause that appears in CGL policies. Non-Cumulation
Clauses are implicated when a loss triggers multiple policy periods,
and courts and parties must figure out which of the triggered policies
are liable and for how much.38 Non-Cumulation Clauses are a prime
example of a policy provision that was first drafted decades ago and,
through rote reuse, has lost its meaning when interpreted and
applied in current disputes.
The Lloyd’s of London Non-Cumulation Clause, which is the
earliest one used in modern occurrence-based insurance policies,
was first created in 1960 by Leslie R. Dew and his fellow London
underwriters.39 The clause originally read as follows:
C. PRIOR INSURANCE AND NON CUMULATION OF LIABILITY
It is agreed that if any loss covered hereunder is also covered in
whole or in part under any other policy issued to the Assured prior
to the inception date hereof the limit of liability hereon as stated in
item 2 of the Declarations shall be reduced by any amounts due to
the Assured on account of such loss under such prior policy
insurance.
Subject to the foregoing paragraph and to all the other terms
and conditions of this policy in the event that personal injury or
property damage arising out of an occurrence covered hereunder
is continuing at the time of termination of this policy Underwriters
will continue to protect the Assured for liability in respect of such
personal injury or property damage without payment of additional
40
premium.

Prior to 1960 when Lloyd’s of London created the first version of
modern “occurrence”-based CGL policies, which is the type of CGL
policy form most commonly used today, CGL policies were

38. See French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 375–77.
39. See id. at 386.
40. Id. (quoting Randolph M. Fields, The Underwriting of Unlimited Risk: The London
Market Umbrella Liability Policy 1950 to 1970, Morgan Owen Medal Essay Submission to the
Chartered Insurance Institute (1994) (Exhibit 16) (LRD 60 Form Policy, Condition C)).
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“accident”-based.41 Under accident-based CGL policies, the
coverage-triggering event was an “accident” that gave rise to an
injury.42 The policies did not define the term “accident.”
Consequently, courts had to determine what “accident” meant as it
was used in the policies.43 The case law was developing such that
some courts had concluded that accidents were not limited in time
and space to a single event, but rather, could include situations that
took place over longer periods of time and caused ongoing
injuries.44 Consequently, in 1960, the CGL policy form was revised
to use a defined term of “occurrence” instead of just the undefined
term “accident.”45
By changing to occurrence-based insurance, the coverage
triggering event became an “occurrence,” which originally was
defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure
to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”46
Significantly, this change to an occurrence-triggering policy form
meant coverage was expressly provided not only for individual
injury-causing events, but also for gradual injury-causing situations
that could span long periods of time. As one insurer representative
in the 1960s explained:
The definition [of “occurrence”] embraces an injurious exposure to
conditions which results in injury. Thus, it is no longer necessary
that the event causing the injury be sudden in character. In most
cases, the injury will be simultaneous with the exposure. However,
in some other cases, injuries will take place over a long period of
time before they become manifest. The slow ingestion of foreign
matters and inhalation of noxious fumes are examples of injuries of
this kind. The definition serves to identify the time of loss for
application of coverage in these cases, viz, the injury must take
place during the policy period. This means that in exposure-type

41. Id. at 387; Stempel, supra note 35, at 363.
42. French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 387.
43. Stempel, supra note 35, at 363–64.
44. See, e.g., Shipman v. Emp’rs. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 125 S.E.2d 72, 75–76 (Ga. Ct. App.
1962) (explaining that an “accident” may take place over time).
45. See, e.g., French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 387; Stempel, supra
note 35, at 364; John J. Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes, 33
INS. COUNS. J. 223, 223 (1966) (“The principal reason given for revision of the [the policy form]
was adverse court decisions.”).
46. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form, Definitions (1973), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 363.
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cases, cases involving cumulative injuries, more than one policy
contract may come into play in determining coverage and its extent
47
under each policy.

This extension of coverage created a problem for insurers
because some injuries simultaneously could be covered under both
the older accident-based policies and the new occurrence-based
policies.48 For example, in situations where a court could conclude
the coverage triggering “accident” under accident-based policies
was the defective manufacture of a product that subsequently
caused an injury, under the occurrence-based policies the injuries
themselves were the triggering event.49 This meant the policyholder
could recover under both policy forms for the same injury and
potentially receive a double recovery.50 The Non-Cumulation Clause
was created to address that problem by preventing the policyholder
from receiving a windfall double recovery.51
Non-Cumulation Clauses became contractual black holes,
however, when they continued to be reused decade after decade
with only minor variations despite the dramatically changing legal
and scientific landscape. At the time the clause was originally
drafted in 1960, the drafters did not conceive of “long-tail” claims
such as the asbestos and environmental claims that later arose in
the 1970s through 1990s when the delayed manifestation of the
injury-causing effects of asbestos exposure became more widely
understood and environmental laws were passed that created
retroactive strict liability for past waste generators, haulers, and
disposers.52 Nor did, or could, the original drafters intend the clause
to apply to such claims.53 The clause was designed to prevent
double recoveries, not to limit recoveries for unforeseen long-tail
claims.54

47. Stempel, supra note 35, at 368 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Norman Nachman, The
New Policy Provisions for General Liability Insurance, 10 CPCU ANNALS 196, 199–200
(1965)). Nachman was the manager of casualty insurance and multiple lines insurance at the
National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, a predecessor to ISO.
48. See French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 387.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 387–88.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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When you attempt to apply Non-Cumulation Clauses to modern
long-tail claims, where the injury is continuously caused over many
years, a contractual black hole appears. The clause reads, in part:
[I]f any loss covered hereunder is also covered in whole or in part
under any other policy issued to the Assured prior to the inception
date hereof the limit of liability hereon . . . shall be reduced by any
amounts due to the Assured on account of such loss under such
55
prior policy insurance.

The policy language does not specify how to determine whether a
loss is “covered” under a prior-incepting policy or who makes the
determination. Nor does it state whether a court judgment is
necessary. It also does not address whether the prior insurer needs
to admit liability in order to trigger the clause’s application.
Further, it is unclear what constitutes an “amount due” under
prior insurance. It could be an amount that a court has adjudicated is
due. Or, it could simply be an amount that a subsequent insurer who
is attempting to avoid liability merely alleges is due from another
insurer that issued a policy in an earlier policy year. Arguably, it
should at least be an amount actually paid by a prior insurer for the
loss, but the policy does not state that.
In addition, the clause is silent regarding how one should deal
with settlements in which a prior incepting insurer denies liability but
settles nonetheless. The clause simply does not address whether
settlement payments are “amounts due” under a Non-Cumulation
Clause. Nor does it state whether later incepting insurance policies
get credit for the actual settlement amounts paid or for the full limits
of the policies issued by the prior incepting policy. As these
examples indicate, Non-Cumulation Clauses become contractual
black holes when they are applied to long-tail claims today.
B. Sue and Labor Clauses
The second candidate for contractual black hole status is the
Sue and Labor Clause.56 Sue and Labor Clauses originated in
Lloyd’s of London’s marine insurance policies in the 1600s.57 A
common version of a Sue and Labor Clause provides:

55. French, “Non-Cumulation Clause,” supra note 13, at 386.
56. See generally Boardman, supra note 31, at 7–8 (describing the origins and history of
Sue and Labor Clauses and considering whether they are contractual black holes).
57. Id. at 7.
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And in case of any Loss o[r] Misfortune, it shall be lawful and
necessary for the Assured . . . to sue, labor and travel for, in, and
about the defense, safeguard and recovery of the Vessel, or any
part thereof, without prejudice to this insurance, to the charges
whereof the Underwriters will contribute their proportion as
provided below. . . .
In the event of expenditure under the Sue and Labor clause, the
Underwriters shall pay the proportion of such expenses that the
amount insured hereunder bears to the Agreed Value, or that
amount insured hereunder (less loss and/or damage payable under
this Policy) bears to the actual value of the salved property,
58
whichever proportion shall be less. . . .

The phrase to “sue, labor and travel for,” or some variation of it, has
been used in marine policies for approximately 400 years.59 The
phrase also has been transferred to other types of insurance and is
now found in inland property policies.60
What does it mean “to sue, labor and travel for, in, and about
the defense, safeguard and recovery of the [the property], or any
part thereof?” If you own a ship, on what occasion would you have
to “sue, labor and travel” to defend or safeguard the ship? Today,
the phrase is basically meaningless to most people. The phrase
appears to have the qualities of a contractual black hole.
With that said, the Sue and Labor Clause is only an apparent
contractual black hole. Although it has been replicated in insurance
policies for hundreds of years and appears to be gibberish on its
face, the clause has not lost its meaning over time. Courts and
insurers know what it means because its meaning and purpose have
been preserved through case law. The clause provides coverage to
the policyholder for the costs the policyholder incurs in an attempt to
avoid or minimize an occurring or impending loss.61 In short, it is a
loss mitigation clause.62

58. Ocean Towing Co. da Venezeula v. Cont’l Ins. Co., No. 89-2819, 1992 WL 40788, at
*6 (E.D. La. Feb. 27, 1992).
59. See Boardman, supra note 31, at 8.
60. See id.
61. See id.; see also BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 21.02[e], at 1739 (18th ed. 2017).
62. See, e.g., Albany Ins. Co. v. Anh Thi Kieu, 927 F.2d 882, 894 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Sue
and labor expenses are sums spent by the assured in an effort to mitigate damages and loss.
‘The purpose of the sue and labor clause [in an insurance contract] is to reimburse the insured
for those expenditures which are made primarily for the benefit of the insurer . . . .’” (alteration
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The odd language used in the clause is a reflection of the times
and circumstances surrounding its original creation. A ship at sea in
the 1600s that encountered a storm or pirates was allowed to do
anything and everything it could to preserve its cargo and the ship.
And, it was allowed to recover from the insurer the costs associated
with doing so, including the “labor” costs incurred and the costs
associated with “suing” anyone who had salvaged the damaged ship
or goods.63 For most ship owners today, fending off pirates is not as
much of problem as it was 400 years ago.
The subsequent transfer of the clause from marine insurance
policies to inland property policies without significant revision only
heightens the potential contractual black hole quality of the clause
because most property owners do not need to worry about fending
off pirates or jettisoning cargo during a storm to save property that is
on land. Indeed, on its face, the language makes little sense in that
context. So, could insurers update the language to make it more
understandable and relevant to the circumstances policyholders
face today that could result in losses? Absolutely, but that does not
mean the language has completely lost its meaning due to rote
reuse over the centuries. There is plenty of case law preserving its
meaning despite the dated and awkward wording.64 So, Sue and
Labor Clauses should be viewed as only apparent, not real,
contractual black holes.
C. Ensuing Loss Clauses
The third candidate for contractual black hole status is the
Ensuing Loss Clause that appears in property policies—both
homeowners and commercial. Many property policies sold today are
“all risk” policies, which means they cover any and all losses unless
the peril causing the loss is specifically excluded.65 Insurers have
added exclusions to such policies to avoid covering certain perils

in original) (quoting Blasser Bros., v. N. Pan–Am. Line, 628 F.2d 376, 386 (5th Cir.1980)));
Armada Supply Inc. v. Wright, 858 F.2d 842, 853 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Sue and labor expenses are
those reasonable costs borne by the assured to mitigate the loss and thus reduce the amount
to be paid by the underwriter.”).
63. See Boardman, supra note 31, at 8.
64. See supra note 62.
65. See, e.g., Jeff Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California Homeowners Recover from
Their Insurer for Subsidence Damages to Their Homes?, 20 PAC. L.J. 783, 785 (1989) (“In an
‘all-risk’ policy, all losses except those specifically excluded are covered. This is the broadest
form of coverage and has been so interpreted by the courts.” (footnote omitted)).
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such as earthquakes and floods.66 In addition to specific earthquake
and flood exclusions, insurers also often include “anti-concurrent
causation” exclusions in their policies.67 Anti-concurrent causation
exclusions purport to exclude coverage for losses caused in any part
by an excluded peril: “This policy does not insure loss or damage
caused directly or indirectly by any Peril excluded.”68 Thus, under
one literal reading of an anti-concurrent causation exclusion, if an
excluded peril plays any role in causing a loss, then the loss
arguably is not covered.
The potential for a contractual black hole to develop in this area
of insurance arises because policies with anti-concurrent causation
(and other) exclusions also often contain an exception to such
exclusions known in the insurance world as an Ensuing Loss
Clause.69 Ensuing Loss Clauses have been in existence since the
early 1900s when they were created following the 1906 San
Francisco fire. Several courts refused to enforce anti-concurrent
causation exclusions that purported to exclude coverage for fire
damage—a covered peril—that resulted when gas lines were broken
by an earthquake—an excluded peril.70
One example of an Ensuing Loss Clause provides: “We insure
for all risks of physical loss to the property described in Coverage A
except for loss caused by: [any of the 6 following excluded
perils]. Any ensuing loss from items 1 through 6 not excluded is
covered.”71 Like the term “accident,” insurers have chosen not to

66. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. HO 00 03 05 11, Exclusion A.2 (2010),
reprinted in ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 19, at 197 (excluding coverage for “loss
caused directly or indirectly by . . . [e]arthquake . . . ” and “flood”); Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form
No. CP 10 20 06 07, Commercial Property Broad Form, Exclusion (b) (2007), reprinted in
BRUCE J. HILLMAN, COMMERCIAL PROPERTY, 404–05 (4th ed. 2009) (noting that commercial all
risk property policies exclude coverage “for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by . . .
[an] [e]arthquake, including any earth sinking, rising or shifting related to such event”);
Christopher C. French, Insuring Floods: The Most Common and Devastating Natural
Catastrophes in America, 60 VILL. L. REV. 53, 61 (2015) (“Almost uniformly, [insurers] have
refused to insure flood losses for non-commercial entities despite selling ‘all risk’ homeowners
property policies.”).
67. See Christopher C. French, The “Ensuing Loss” Clause in Insurance Policies: The
Forgotten and Misunderstood Antidote to Anti-Concurrent Causation Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J.
215, 216 (2012).
68. Blaine Constr. Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 171 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting
insurance policy at issue).
69. See French, supra note 67, at 217.
70. See id. at 216–17.
71. Roberts v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 705 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc).
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define the term “ensuing loss” in their policies. Readers must thus
go to other sources to attempt to understand it. A standard
dictionary defines “ensue” as: “1. to come afterward; follow
immediately” or “2. to happen as a consequence; result.”72 In other
words, the Ensuing Loss Clause reinstates coverage for losses that
follow as a result of, at least in part, a covered peril even if an
excluded peril is also part of the causation chain, notwithstanding
the presence of an anti-concurrent causation exclusion. The
confusing, and apparently contradictory, language in Ensuing Loss
Clauses combined with inconsistent anti-concurrent causation
exclusions creates the right setting for the formation of a contractual
black hole.
Indeed, on its face, an Ensuing Loss Clause is a contractual
black hole. The wording alone allows almost no light into the
meaning for the reader. In a world where every loss is caused by
numerous events, how can a loss that is “caused directly or
indirectly by any Peril excluded” be excluded from coverage under
an anti-concurrent exclusion,73 while simultaneously be covered
under an Ensuing Loss Clause? From this contractual black hole,
courts are left with the fruitless task of divining meaning.
Not surprisingly, Ensuing Loss Clauses have flummoxed
courts.74 In determining coverage, some courts simply default to the
“efficient proximate cause” doctrine to determine whether a covered
or an excluded peril is the first or dominant cause of the loss.75
Other courts look at whether there was a separate and intervening

72. Ensue, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2014).
73. Blaine Constr. Corp., 171 F.3d at 346 (quoting insurance policy at issue).
74. See French, supra note 67, at 228–34 (collecting cases).
75. As one court stated:
The efficient proximate cause rule operates as an interpretive tool to establish
coverage when a covered peril ‘sets other causes into motion which, in an unbroken
sequence, produce the result for which recovery is sought.’ The opposite
proposition, however, is not a rule of law. When an excluded peril sets in motion a
causal chain that includes covered perils, the efficient proximate cause rule does
not mandate exclusion of the loss. ‘[T]he efficient proximate cause rule operates in
favor of coverage. A converse rule would, of course, operate in favor of no
coverage. . . . Because policies should normally be construed in favor of coverage,
because there is no settled law favoring this argument, contrary to the insurer’s
claim, and because the insurer does not offer any further justification or authority
supporting such a rule, we decline to adopt the rule urged by the insurer.’
Vision One, LLC v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 276 P.3d 300, 309 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (first
quoting McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 837 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Wash. 1992) (en
banc); then quoting Key Tronic Corp. v. Aetna (Cigna) Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 881 P.2d
201, 206 (Wash. 1994) (en banc)).

CONTRACTUAL BLACK HOLES ESSAY (MORE DUKE COMMENTS) (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

BLACK HOLES IN INSURANCE POLICIES

11/4/2017 3:56 PM

117

covered peril that caused the loss.76 And other courts simply analyze
whether a covered peril played any role in causing the loss.77 If it
did, then there is coverage. Interestingly, despite the inconsistency
between anti-concurrent causation exclusions and Ensuing Loss
Clauses, many courts have held that Ensuing Loss Clauses are
unambiguous and, by implication, not contractual black holes.
Courts have reached such conclusions even though they have
interpreted the clauses inconsistently and made inconsistent
coverage determinations when applying them.78
In sum, the Ensuing Loss Clause is a better candidate for
contractual black hole status than the Sue and Labor Clause.
Although the origin of the Ensuing Loss Clause is known, unlike the
wording of the Sue and Labor Clause, the wording of an Ensuing
Loss Clause is confusing and contradictory when read together with
an anti-concurrent causation exclusion. In addition, unlike the Sue
and Labor Clause, there is a lack of consensus among courts
regarding its meaning and application.
D. The Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion
The final candidate for contractual black hole status is the
Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion that ISO used in its CGL
policy form between 1973 and 1986 and was frequently litigated
during the 1990s. The exclusion is worth discussing here, not
because the language in the exclusion has lost its meaning due to
decades of rote reuse, but rather, as an example of the dynamic that
can lead to the creation of insurance contractual black holes.
As discussed in Part II.A, after insurers changed the CGL policy
form from accident-based to occurrence-based in the 1960s, CGL
policies unquestionably covered injuries that resulted from ongoing
injury-causing processes, as opposed to just accidental “events.”79
Consequently, environmental damage claims were covered so long
as they were unexpected and unintended:
76. See, e.g., Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 167–68 (Fla.
2003) (holding that the repair of structural deficiencies due to design defects was not an
ensuing loss because there was no property damage separate from the defects themselves).
77. See, e.g., Roberts v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 705 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Ariz. 1985)
(en banc) (holding that damages caused by bees, an excluded peril, were covered due to an
ensuing loss provision because the damage caused by honey leaking from the bees’ hive
“ensued”—resulted—after the bees had been exterminated).
78. Compare Roberts, 705 P.2d at 1337, with Swire Pac. Holdings, 845 So. 2d at 166.
79. See supra Part II.A.
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The standard, occurrence-based policy thus covered property
damage resulting from gradual pollution. So long as the ultimate
loss was neither expected nor intended, courts generally extended
coverage to all pollution-related damage, even if it arose from the
80
intentional discharge of pollutants.

Indeed, when insurers changed the CGL policy form from
accident-based to occurrence-based in the 1960s, insurers actually
marketed the new policies as covering gradual injury-causing
situations such as pollution so long as the injury was not expected or
intended by the policyholder.81
For example, in 1965, Gilbert Bean, a former executive of a
major insurer and a member of a committee that was responsible for
reviewing and drafting policy language, stated the following with
respect to whether the new CGL policy form covered environmental
claims: “Manufacturing risks producing insecticides, plant foods,
fertilizers, weed killers, paints, chemicals, thermostats or other
regulatory devices, to name a few, have created gradual [property
damage] exposure. They need this protection and should
legitimately expect to be able to buy it, so we have included it.”82 A
year later in 1966, Mr. Bean similarly wrote: “[There is] coverage for
gradual [bodily injury] or gradual [property damage] resulting over a
period of time from exposure to the insured’s waste disposal.
Examples would be gradual adverse effect of smoke, fumes, air or
stream pollution, contamination of water supply or vegetation.”83
80. New Castle Cty. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1197 (3d Cir.
1991), abrogated by N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991).
81. See, e.g., Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W. 2d 570, 574 (Wis. 1990) (“At least
with respect to environmental claims, contemporaneous industry commentary on the 1966
CGL policy indicates that there was no intent to avoid coverage for unexpected or unintended
pollution.”); Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 849–71 (N.J.
1993) (discussing the evidence, commentators’ views, and case law regarding coverage for
environmental injuries under the 1966 CGL policy form); see also Thomas Reiter, David
Strasser & William Pohlman, The Pollution Exclusion Under Ohio Law: Staying The Course,
59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1165, 1191–93 (1991) (discussing coverage for environmental claims under
occurrence-based CGL policies and the history of insurers’ positions regarding such
coverage).
82. Robert Saylor & David Zolensky, Pollution Coverage and the Intent of the CGL
Drafters: The Effect of Living Backwards, 1 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. (INS.) 4425, 4432 (1987)
(quoting Gilbert Bean, New Comprehensive General and Automobile Program, The Effect on
Manufacturing Risks, presented at Mutual Insurance Technical Conference (Nov. 15–18,
1965)).
83. Id. at 4438 n.34 (1987) (quoting Gilbert Bean, Summary of Broadened Coverage
Under New CGL Policies With Necessary Limitation To Make This Broadening Possible
(1966)).
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One contemporaneous insurance policy manual that was used
to explain the coverage provided under the CGL policy form had the
following hypothetical as an example of an “occurrence” that would
be covered under the new occurrence-based policy form:
Wilson Chemical Company, the Named Insured, Occupies the
Second Floor of a Commercial Building Owned by West End
Cleaners. The West End Operation Occupies the Entire First Floor.
Wilson Chemical used Acid as a raw material. The acid is stored in
100 gallon drums on the second floor. One storage drum
developed a leak allowing acid to drip onto the floor. This
eventually caused extensive damage to several structural supports
of the building and caused a partial collapse which destroyed much
of West End’s equipment. West End Cleaners Brought a suit
against Wilson Chemical for the replacement of their equipment.
Would Wilson’s CGL Policy Pay?
Yes. This situation would meet the second part of the definition of
occurrence, as the slow leak of acid constitutes a continuous or
84
repeated exposure to conditions.

For at least two reasons, the insurers’ appetite for covering
environmental claims quickly waned. First, several significant
environmental incidents, such as the Torrey Canyon disaster and
the Santa Barbara offshore oil spill, created widespread, negative
media coverage regarding pollution.85 Second, in 1970, Congress
passed the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act, which imposed
strict liability for certain discharges into bodies of water.86 Thus,
widespread negative media attention targeted polluters, and the law
began imposing strict liability for certain environmental injuries.
In response to these developments, insurers drafted what is
now known as the qualified pollution exclusion or Sudden and
Accidental Pollution Exclusion, which first was used as a policy add-

84. Stempel, Assessing The Coverage Carnage, supra note 35, at 372 (quoting
[ANONYMOUS INSURER], THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY WORKBOOK 11–12
(1973)).
85. See, e.g., Warren Brockmeier, Pollution—The Risk and Insurance Problem, 12 FOR
DEF. 77, 77–78 (1971) (discussing changes to CGL coverage after environmental disasters in
the 1960s); James Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15
FORUM 551, 553 (1980) (“Pollution claims burst on the insurance scene following the Torrey
Canyon disaster and the Santa Barbara off-shore drilling oil spills in 1969.”).
86. Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 102, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (formerly codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1161)
(superseded by Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 2, Pub. L. No.
92-500, 88 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2012))).
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on endorsement in 1970 and then became part of the CGL policy
form itself in 1973.87 The Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion
is worded as follows:
This insurance does not apply: . . . (f) to bodily injury or property
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape
of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals,
liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or
body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge,
88
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.

In general, under this exclusion, claims related to environmental
damage are not covered unless the event giving rise to the damage
was “sudden and accidental.”
The use of the phrase “sudden and accidental” in the exclusion
is an example of rote reuse of boilerplate language in standardized
insurance policies. The phrase previously had been used in Boiler
and Machinery insurance policies and had a judicially established
meaning: “courts uniformly had construed the phrase to mean
unexpected and unintended.”89 Thus, when the phrase was
transplanted to CGL policies in the Sudden and Accidental Pollution
Exclusion, it already was understood to mean “unexpected and
unintended” in the insurance context.
In sum, when the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion
was created, the definition of “occurrence” already limited coverage
to injuries or damage that were “neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured”90 and the phrase “sudden and
accidental” was understood to mean unexpected and unintended.
Consequently, when seeking approval of the new exclusion, it is
unsurprising that insurers told state insurance commissioners across
87. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1196–1200; Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form
No. GL 00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, Exclusion (f) (1973),
reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 366.
88. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form, Exclusion (f) (1973), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 366.
89. New Castle Cty. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1197 (3d Cir.
1991), abrogated by N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991);
see STEVEN PLITT ET AL., 10A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 150:30 (3d ed. 2017) (“When coverage
is limited to a sudden ‘breaking’ of machinery, the word ‘sudden’ should be given its primary
meaning as a happening without previous notice or as something coming or occurring
unexpectedly as unforeseen or unprepared for. That is, ‘sudden’ is not to be construed as
synonymous with instantaneous.”)).
90. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

CONTRACTUAL BLACK HOLES ESSAY (MORE DUKE COMMENTS) (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

11/4/2017 3:56 PM

BLACK HOLES IN INSURANCE POLICIES

121

the country that the new exclusion was not a reduction in coverage
for pollution claims, but rather, was only a “clarification” of the
coverage provided under CGL policies.91 For example, in a June 10,
1970 letter to the Georgia State Insurance Commissioner, the
insurance industry stated:
[T]he impact of the [pollution exclusion clause] on the vast majority
of risks would be no change. It is rather a situation of
clarification. . . . Coverage for expected or intended pollution and
contamination is not now present as it is excluded by the definition
92
of occurrence. Coverage for accidental mishaps is continued. . . .

As a mere “clarification” regarding the existing scope of coverage
provided under CGL policies for pollution claims, insurers did not
provide a reduction in premiums in exchange for the addition of the
new exclusion.93
The insurers’ position regarding the meaning of “sudden and
accidental” changed, however, when they were confronted with
countless lawsuits with hundreds of billions of dollars at stake in
widespread environmental insurance coverage litigation in the 1980s
and 1990s.94 The onslaught of environmental insurance coverage
litigation occurred because the landscape regarding liability for
environmental claims dramatically changed within a few years of the
addition of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion to CGL
policies.
In 1976, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA).95 In 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) was passed
and, in 1986, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) was passed (collectively, these environmental statutes are

91. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1200–05 (discussing the insurance industry’s
representations regarding the scope of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion);
Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 848–53 (N.J. 1993) (same);
Joy Techs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493, 498–99 (W. Va. 1992) (same).
92. Morton, 629 A.2d at 853 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Claussen v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571, 1573 (S.D. Ga. 1987)).
93. See, e.g., id. at 848, 853; Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1202.
94. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1171 (noting that the estimated industry
liability for the environmental cleanup was $150 billion to $700 billion).
95. Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334;
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (current
versions of both amendments can be found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2012)).
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known as the “Superfund” laws).96 The Superfund laws imposed
retroactive, strict, and joint and several liability for the cleanup of
environmental injuries on a variety of entities: (1) the current owners
and operators of disposal facilities, (2) the owners or operators of
disposal facilities during the time of the disposal, (3) the entities that
arranged for the disposal or treatment of hazardous materials, and
(4) the transporters of hazardous materials.97 These new
environmental laws created hundreds of billions of dollars of
liabilities for policyholders almost overnight.98 Policyholders, in turn,
demanded that their CGL insurers pay such liabilities.
When faced with a bill for hundreds of billions of dollars,
insurers took the position that the Sudden and Accidental Pollution
Exclusion unambiguously precluded coverage for any and all
environmental liabilities unless such liabilities resulted from “abrupt”
releases of contaminants.99 Because the strict liability version of
contra proferentem that often applies in insurance disputes means
insurers lose if the policy language at issue is ambiguous, the law
essentially forced insurers to take the position that the exclusion was
unambiguous.100 As a corollary to that maxim, insurers also refused
to produce any documents or allow discovery regarding the original
drafters’ intent regarding the meaning of the exclusion because
extrinsic evidence should not be relevant or discoverable if the
policy language was unambiguous.101
Policyholders, on the other hand, disputed that “sudden”
unambiguously means “abrupt” by pointing out that “sudden” also

96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012).
97. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing CERCLA’s
retroactive and joint and several liability); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497,
1506 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060, 1062
(C.D. Cal. 1987) (discussing CERCLA’s imposition of strict, and joint and several liability).
98. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1171.
99. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 45, 52 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1995) (“[Insurers] argue the term ‘sudden’ in the exception to the pollution exclusion
has a temporal meaning synonymous with ‘abrupt’ . . . .”); Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident
Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 852 (N.J. 1993) (noting that insurers’ position was that CGL
policies only covered pollution if the releases causing the pollution were abrupt); Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 538 (Wyo. 1996) (stating that insurers contend
“sudden incorporates a temporal element”); Reiter et al., supra note 81, at 1174 (noting that
insurers generally argue that “sudden” means “abrupt” or “happening quickly”).
100. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,711 A.2d at 54 (noting that the policyholder
only obtained drafting history documents regarding the Sudden and Accidental Pollution
Exclusion after successfully moving to compel their production).
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can mean “unexpected.”102 Policyholders then requested documents
from state insurance commissioners and successfully moved to
compel the production of the drafting history from ISO and insurers
regarding the exclusion to see whether the insurers’ litigation
position was consistent with: 1) the original intent and purpose of the
exclusion, and 2) insurers’ statements to state insurance
commissioners regarding the exclusion.103 Of course, once obtained,
the actual historic record regarding the origins of the exclusion
belied the insurers’ litigation position that the term “sudden” in the
Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion exclusively and
unequivocally means “abrupt.”104
The story of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion is
an exemplar regarding the formula for the creation of contractual
black holes. First, information regarding the original intent and
purpose of a phrase is lost through concealment or the passage of
time. Then, the drafters of the contractual language—ISO in this
instance—elect not to revise the language despite a patent or latent
ambiguity in the language. Indeed, ISO continued to decline to
revise the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion for over a
decade while numerous courts construed the exclusion in
completely inconsistent ways.105 ISO finally changed the language in
102. See, e.g., id. at 52 (“DuPont argues the term ‘sudden’ is ambiguous, and the [c]ourt
should interpret ‘sudden’ to mean ‘unexpected.’”); Sinclair Oil Corp., 929 P.2d at 538 (stating
that the policyholder “contends the term is ambiguous because although sudden can mean
‘abrupt’ or ‘happening quickly’ it can also mean ‘unexpected’”).
103. See, e.g., Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 623
A.2d 1128, 1130 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) (“ISO produced approximately 250,000 to 275,000
pages of responsive documents, which had been previously collected for production by ISO
and contained material related to the development of CGL language prior to March of 1983
and pollution coverage and exclusion language prior to December 1985.”); Morton, 629 A.2d
at 848–53 (discussing the documentation regarding insurers’ statements to state insurance
commissioners about the regulatory approval of the Sudden and Accidental Pollution
Exclusion); Joy Techs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493, 498–99 (W. Va. 1992)
(same).
104. See, e.g., Morton, 629 A.2d at 875 (applying regulatory estoppel to prevent the
insurers from taking a position regarding the meaning of “sudden and accidental” that was
inconsistent with their representations to state insurance commissioners); Joy, 421 S.E.2d at
500 (same).
105. Compare Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Colo. 1991) (en
banc) (“Although ‘sudden’ can reasonably be defined to mean abrupt or immediate, it can also
reasonably be defined to mean unexpected and unintended. Since the term ‘sudden’ is
susceptible to more than one reasonable definition, the term is ambiguous, and we therefore
construe the phrase . . . against the insurer . . . .”), and Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
380 S.E.2d 686, 690 (Ga. 1989) (“In sum, we conclude that the pollution exclusion clause is
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. The clause must therefore be construed
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the exclusion after the insurers’ litigation position regarding the
meaning of the language had been rejected by numerous courts and
insurers had been held liable for billions of dollars associated with
environmental cleanups.106
Ultimately, the massive litigation regarding the Sudden and
Accidental Pollution Exclusion prevented the exclusion from
becoming a contractual black hole because the insurers’ position
regarding the origin and meaning of the language in the exclusion
was proven to be inconsistent with reality. The result, however,
could have been completely different. The exclusion could have
become another contractual black hole through rote reuse of
language and the passage of time. It did not, however, because the
litigation regarding the meaning of the Sudden and Accidental
Pollution Exclusion occurred fairly soon after the exclusion was
drafted. In addition, the policyholders had the resources and tenacity
to force the insurance industry to produce the documentation
regarding the original intent and meaning of the exclusion.
CONCLUSION
The potential for contractual black holes to appear in
standardized commercial contracts is real. Insurance policies are

in favor of the insured to mean ‘unexpected and unintended.’”), with Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v.
ARTRA Grp., Inc., 659 A.2d 1295, 1308 (Md. 1995) (“We agree with the interpretation of the
pollution exclusion clause adopted in numerous other cases. . . . Under those interpretations,
the language of such an exclusion provides coverage only for pollution which is both sudden
and accidental. It does not apply to gradual pollution. . . .”), and Upjohn Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co.,
476 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Mich. 1991) (“We find persuasive the recent opinions . . . which find the
terms of the pollution exclusion to be unambiguous. We conclude that when considered in its
plain and easily understood sense, ‘sudden’ is defined with a ‘temporal element that joins
together conceptually the immediate and the unexpected.’” (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted)).
106. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 11 85, Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form, Exclusion (f) (1986), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 13, at 374
(reflecting the change from the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion to the Absolute
Pollution Exclusion in ISO’s 1986 CGL policy form); see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra
note 61, at 1896–1900 (citing decisions in 14 states where courts rejected the insurers’
litigation position regarding the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the “Absolute” Exclusion in Context and
in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1998)
(“Responding to the flurry of environmental litigation over the application of the “sudden and
accidental” pollution exclusion, the insurance industry during the mid-1980s largely adopted
new standard pollution exclusion language for commercial general liability (CGL) policies.
Since the mid-1980s, the standard form CGL has included the so-called absolute pollution
exclusion. . . .” (footnote omitted)).
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fertile ground for the creation of contractual black holes. Many
policies are drafted by a centralized organization—ISO—and the
policy language is reused by rote decade after decade. As nondrafters of the policy language, the insurers that use the ISO policy
forms often do not even know what the policy language means
themselves.
The rote reuse of policy language then becomes a selfperpetuating cycle because a strict liability version of contra
proferentem often applies in insurance disputes. This dictates that
insurers always take the position that policy language is
unambiguous. Consequently, there is a disincentive for insurers to
revise policy language because any changes to it could be viewed
as an admission that the old language was ambiguous. Over time,
as the policy language becomes antiquated and begins to lose
meaning, it is reused nonetheless.
This dynamic, combined with the increasingly complex structure
and organization of policies, has resulted in policies, as a whole or in
part, appearing to be contractual black holes. An examination of the
Non-Cumulation Clause, Sue and Labor Clause, Ensuing Loss
Clause, and the Sudden and Accidental Pollution Exclusion
demonstrates that some policy provisions have become contractual
black holes, some provisions are only apparent contractual black
holes, and some provisions were saved before they became black
holes.

